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Although possession has long been intimately linked to labor, recent
historical work on land claims during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries suggests that the clash of divergent legal cultures of possession
drove the two apart. This clash yielded an American concept of possession
much more deeply connected to industrialization than the traditional
understanding of labor. By providing evidence of how our concept of
labor was industrialized, this article questions the outcomes in modem
possession cases, particularly as they impact development and
environmental preservation in rural areas.
II. INTRODUCTION
Within the common law, our theoretical justifications for private
property tend to assume an initial blank slate and, from there, elaborate a
defensible rule of first possession.' This primacy of possession has been
justified on a number of grounds from economic efficiency to self-
Copyright C 2011, Jill M. Fraley.
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1 Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1221-22
(1979) [hereinafter Epstein, Root of Title]. This assumption in property tends to rely
strongly on a narrative framework rather than a scientific or analytical one. See Carol M.
Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 37-38 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Property as
Storytelling].
2 See RICHARD POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 36-45 (5th ed. 1998), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAw 54, 54-55 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002)
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actualization and personhood to communication. Such an elaboration of
competing theories results, in part, from the dominant role of first
possession rules in establishing property rights across many different
cultures and legal systems.s Indeed, first possession rules are common to a
variety of legal schemes across the broadest range of cultures-from
Native American to African law and from Civil to Islamic law.6 Even in
the ancient era, there are indications to suggest the first occupation of a
parcel of land generated a right of ownership,' and in the modem world,
first possession rules have spread from property in land to other interests
such as oil and gas,8 water rights,9 and wildlife.'o Therefore, Hume,
(discussing how a theory of first possession creates efficiency and generates economic
value).
3 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1 (1993). A self-actualization
and personhood theory of property "connects ownership with central idelogical
commitments of liberal thought, particularly with notions of freedom and individualism."
Id.
4 See Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 1, at 38-39 (taking into account that
philosophers use narratives to communicate principles of property).
Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & EcoN.
393,393-94 (1995).
6 Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187,
190 (1992). See Lueck, supra note 5, at 394, for a summary of the range of cultures that
use first possession as a basis for acquiring property. For specific examples of cultures that
use first possession as a basis for acquiring property, see Jacob H. Beekhuis, Civil Law, in 4
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PROPERTY AND TRUST 3, 3-21
(Frederick H. Lawson et al. eds., 1973) (providing a historical progression of property
rights in civil law); KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 224-26 (5th ed. 1973) (showing that
despite conflicting testimony, first possession principles appear to have existed in some
Native American law, particularly in how the Cheyenne Tribes determined the property
rights of horses found or taken during raids); K. Bentsi-Enchill, The Traditional Legal
Systems of Africa, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PROPERTY
AND TRUST 68, 94-95 (Frederick H. Lawson et. al. eds., 1973) (noting that acquisition of
property in African Tribes involved first possession or settlement).
7 See sources cited supra note 6.
8 See Hammonds v. Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Ky. Ct. App.
1934). Indeed, historically courts have compared the capture of wild animals to drilling for
oil and gas while developing doctrines of property. See id. at 206.
9 See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (Cal. 1853) (noting first occupancy as the
primary rule of water rights).
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Sugden, and others have argued that first possession rules are in some way
embedded with a "natural prominence.""
Although we have strongly favored first possession as a means for
understanding and justifying our system of private ownership, this
justification for property is by no means beyond question. Richard Epstein
has argued that there is no moral justification for first possession rules,
even though he acknowledges that there is a strong practical and intuitive
appeal to such rules.12  His argument echoed the more ancient one of
Blackstone, who suggested that our embrace of the first possession theory
carried with it an air of desperation.13 Blackstone believed we put such an
emphasis on possession that "we seem afraid to look back at the means by
which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title." 4
Both Epstein and Blackstone strongly favored an opportunity to
examine theories of possession in light of their evolution and historical
entrenchment. 5 Yet, in the decades since, our theories of property have
continued to elaborate philosophical and theoretical justifications for first
possession rules without substantially engaging the question of what
possession has meant through time. 16 Thus, this article is not an attempt to
10 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175-76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The quintessential case of
first possession rules is often considered to be Pierson v. Post, which is a classic of student
property texts and involves the capture of a wild fox. Angela Fernandez, The Lost Record
of Pierson v. Post, The Famous Fox Case, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 149, 149-50 (2009).
" See, e.g., James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin ofProperty Rights, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 139, 155 (2009) (discussing how Sugden agreed with Hume that there is a
"natural prominence" in the assignment of persons, objects, and possession).
12 Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1240-41.
13 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2-11 (1776), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES
ON PROPERTY LAW 45, 46 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002) (discussing how a
theory of first possession creates efficiency and generates economic value).
14 Id. There is a certain oddity to the idea of first possession as a justification for title to
private property. To summarize Henry George's argument: to have the earth laid out in
claim by a first generation when countless more will follow seems an odd proposition in the
long term. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 344 (1929).
15 See Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1241, for his specific suggestions in
regards to this inquiry. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 46.
16 See infra Part V. When possession has been examined, our focus has fallen on
adverse possession cases, although generally without any awareness of an evolving
definition. See, e.g., 16 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.01 (Michael
Allen Wolf ed., 2010) (providing a definition of adverse possession and how collective acts
over a period of time can establish ownership). A more limited inquiry has focused on the
meaning of possession within adverse possession cases, primarily, although not exclusively,
(continued)
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join the many voices that have justified or criticized first possession rules
but rather an attempt to answer the narrow, and yet, critical question of
what we have meant by possession: to examine theories of possession with
an eye to both socio-historical circumstances and legal evolution.
Building on Martin Horowitz's study of the transformation of the
common law in America during the nineteenth century, scholars have
investigated how property doctrines-including our concepts of
possession-incorporate preferences for industry, and thereby,
detrimentally impact current environmental protection initiatives." Such
work is critical to understanding how current property doctrines implicate
particular views of land and natural resources-including moral
perspectives. Unfortunately, most contemporary works stop short of
questioning Horowitz's launching point in post-revolutionary America.18
As Richard Powell lamented more than a decade ago, there has been very
little historical work on the earliest era of land law in America. Yet, there
is strong evidence to suggest that significant and driving doctrinal changes
occurred long before the American Revolution. Drawing out some of this
lost period in the legal history of property law, this article argues that the
transformation of the common law in America began before the
revolutionary era-driven by both increasing industrialization and the
conflict of imperial powers seeking natural resources in the New World.19
within the later periods and describing some of the uses of land that contribute to adverse
possession claims. Id. See William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the
Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 79, 106-12 (1996), for how the meaning of possession and time provisions differ
substantially across the states.
17 See, e.g., John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996) [hereinafter Sprankling, Antiwilderness]; John G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 816,
817 (1994); Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 16, at 79-80.
18 See, e.g., Wythe Holt, Morton Horwitz and the Transformation of American Legal
History, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 663 (1982); Jenny B. Wahl, Twice-Told Tales: An
Economist's Retelling of the Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, 37 TULSA L.
REv. 879 (2002).
19 See Sprankling, Antiwilderness, supra note 17, at 523. John Sprankling argues that
the wilderness context in America was significant in adoption of the common law within
America. Id. The intent of this paper is not to disagree with Sprankling's conclusions
regarding the significance of the American wilderness in the adoption of the common law
but rather to add to Sprankling's insights by drawing out the importance of both natural
(continued)
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Part III of this article outlines the traditional literature on the primacy
of possession and then engages the common law understanding of
possession, particularly as it has intersected with a labor-ownership theory
of property. This section argues that prior to colonization, the British
concept of possession was strongly aligned with an understanding of labor
as indicative of possession. Part IV introduces the concept of waste-a
lesser-known common law property doctrine-which flowed from the
association of labor and possession. Part V follows the evolution of the
British concept of possession as it encountered colonial North America and
increasing industrialization. This section demonstrates how pressures of
industrialization and the clash of divergent legal cultures of possession
during the colonial era drove the concepts of possession and labor apart.
As a result, the concept of private property rooted in possession that took
hold in developing American law cannot be traced entirely to either the
British heritage or revolutionary philosophy and politics but rather
significantly evolved through the process of settlement, particularly
through the colonial contest for natural resources. Yet, our cultural
connotations still associate private property with a labor theory of
possession in ways that affirm the primacy and nearly absolute
inviolability of private property. Finally, Part VI considers how this
historical evolution of possession is relevant to our modem struggles with
private exploitation of natural resources.
III. POSSESSION & THE ROOT OF OWNERSHIP
One need not read far in the common law literature of property to find
tribute to the primacy of rules of first possession.20 The right of exclusive
possession is "the bedrock of English land law"21 or in the words of
Epstein, "the backbone of the common law system of property rights." 2 2 In
Sabariego v. Maverick,23 a trespass case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1887, the Court reasoned that "first possession should in such
resources and the context of the imperial clash in the Appalachian Mountains during early
colonization.
20 Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1244.
21 Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd., [1997] A.C. 655 (H.L.), 703 (appeal taken from Eng.).
With that said, Carol Rose has argued that Blackstone would have seen the right of
exclusive possession as an "ideal type rather than a reality." Carol M. Rose, Canons of
Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 604 (1998).
22 Richard A. Epstein, How to Create-or Destroy-Wealth in Real Property, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 742 (2007).
23 124 U.S. 261 (1887).
2011] 55
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cases be the better evidence of right" because such a conclusion was "the
just and necessary inference of law."24 In Blackstone's words,
"[O]ccupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally
gained." 25 Further back, the English preference for rules of first possession
may find their root in Roman law,26 which was highly influential on both
civil and common law systems.27 Its central concept was the idea of
28dominium, or the right to full control and to exclude others.
A. Definitions ofPossession
With first possession serving as such a staple of the common law, we
29have tended to assume that it is a well-understood concept. Yet, our
many affirmations of possession as a bedrock principle shed more light on
the rights obtained by possession rather than on the meaning of possession.
Perhaps we are, as Blackstone once said, afraid of looking too closely
because we have been oddly comfortable with a circular definition.30
Property is defined in terms of possession, and possession is defined in
terms of property." Consider Merriam-Webster's musings on the subject:
Possess: Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French
possesser to have possession of, take possession of, from
Latin possessus, past participle of possidire, from potis
able, having the power + sedire to sit ... 1) a: to have and
hold as property: own; b: to have as an attribute,
knowledge, or skill; 2) a: to take into one's possession; b:
to enter into and control firmly: dominate.32
24 Id. at 298.
25 BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 51.
26 See Joshua Getzler, Roman Ideas of Landownership, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND




29 0. Lee Reed, What is "Property"?, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 498 (2004).
30 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at 46.
31 Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1222, 1227. Epstein has also criticized first
possession theories of property as circular, but his argument rests on the association of
possession and labor. Id at 1225-28. Epstein argues that "[t]he labor theory is called upon
to aid the theory that possession is the root of title; yet it depends for its own success upon
the proposition that the possession of self is the root of title to self." Id. at 1227.
32posSess Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.merriam-webst
er.com/dictionary/possess?show-0&t=1288331078 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
56 [39:51
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Property: Etymology: Middle English proprete, from
Anglo-French proprete, from Latin proprietat-, proprietas,
from propius ... 2) a: something owned or possessed;
specifically: a piece of real estate; b: the exclusive right to
possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing: ownership; c:
something to which a person or business has a legal title. 3
A British case from 1919, In re Southern Rhodesia,34 is an excellent
example of the confusion. When the court was challenged to determine
whether a group of natives had possession of the land at issue, the court
found that they did not have possession because they did not have a system
of property that the Europeans recognized." They did not have possession
of the land specifically because they did not have "transferable rights of
property as we know them."36 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court met the
same quandary when interpreting an early treaty in Foster v. Neilson. In
Foster, the court engaged the different notions of possession, asking of the
French claims:
What period is referred to? Did it mean at the period when
the enterprising La Salle first descended the Mississippi,
which the French considered the first possession; or when
a few adventurers endeavoured to establish a settlement at
Biloxi, which was speedily abandoned; or when her
restless monarch, stretching his influence from the
northern lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, was labouring to
effectuate his gigantic project of attaining the ascendancy
over the entire continent?38
Black's Law Dictionary has defined an occupant as equivalent to one
"who can control what goes on on premises."39  Frustratingly, Black's
3 Property Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTERDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/possess?show=0&t=1288331078 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
34 In re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 (P.C.) (appeal taken from the unrecognized
nation, Rhodesia).
3 Id. at 233-34.
6 Id. at 234.
3 27 U.S. 253, 273-74 (1829).
8 Id. at 269.
3 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 973 (9th ed. 2009); see Smith v. Sno Eagles Snowmobile
Club, Inc., 823 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Black's definition of
occupant and discussing possession in the context of determining an "occupant").
2011] 57
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definition points to the distinction between who can control a property and
who has a right to control the property,40 when in fact, the later is often
derived from the former. Possession is not such an easy thing to ascertain.
Such confusion is particularly notable because the most literal
interpretation is not physically possible. To possess means to have and to
hold, to sit upon-not a definition that works literally for the appropriation
of more than a few square feet of land at the most.4 1 Indeed, when the term
"possess" has been used within legal regulations, it has often been found
difficult to establish.42 Consider the issue as a hypothetical: does Sam
possess a new uncharted and uninhabited island, measuring 2,000 acres,
when he is shipwrecked on the shore? Does he possess the part where he
has built a small lean-to of tree branches? The part where he forages for
fruits, berries, and fresh water? Or only the part where he sits day after
day on the tallest point, hoping for a glimpse of a ship?
B. Theories ofPossession
With possession lacking substantial definition, it has been noted that
the idea of a rule of first possession is misleading and that "title more often
also depended upon labor, cultivation, and improvement."A3 In reality,
possession is more of a legal metaphor-a stand in for a much more
extensive and culturally contingent concept." In its most basic sense,
40 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 973, 1046.
41 Id. at 1046.
42 See, e.g., Donald W. Baker, Some Thoughts on Agricultural Liens Under the New
U.C.C. Article 9, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1417, 1432 n. 48 (2000). There are, of course, a number
of musings on precisely what it means to possess a handgun within the meaning of criminal
statutes. See, e.g., Jenny Miao Jiang, Regulating Litigation Under the Protection ofLawful
Commerce in Arms Act: Economic Activity or Regulatory Nullity?, 70 ALBANY L. REv. 537,
559-60 (2007).
43 James R. Rasband, Questioning the Rule of Capture Metaphor for Nineteenth
Century Public Law: A Look at R.S. 2477, 35 ENvTL. L. 1010, 1012 (2005). The emphasis
on labor may also be traceable to the Roman approach to property, which specifically
focused on choosing a system of property ownership that maximized the utility of all land.
See Brian Gardiner, Comment, Squatters' Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for
Equitable Application ofProperty Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 119, 124-25 (1997).
44See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2009). The metaphor is
apparent when modem cases add the descriptive "actual" before possession to reference a
more literal holding of the thing in question. See generally United States v. Caraway, 411
F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing a criminal statute that makes the actual or
constructive possession of a firearm a felony).
58 [39:51
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possession means to hold, as a handful of land was held when title was
transferred via the ceremony of seisin.45 Just as the ritual of seisin is
symbolic of a much larger transfer,46 so is our idea of possession. We do
not in fact ever occupy or hold more than the tiniest bit of earth, even if we
build a house, cultivate, and place animals upon a much larger portion of
land. When common law sources spoke more than a sentence or two about
first possession, they inevitably moved more towards explaining a theory
of labor than a literal theory of possession.4 7
Such theories of labor are generally now grounded in the Lockean
view of property.48 Social philosopher John Locke viewed property as an
institution of natural law, which arose without the intervention of the state
(or even its existence) and stemmed from the direct investment of a
person's labor.4 9 Locke's theory went hand-in-hand with the theory of first
possession,so which of course was actually established through proving
one's labor: the building and occupation of a dwelling, the planting of
fields, the building of fences, the taming of animals, and so forth." In
45 See Lauerman v. Destocki, 662 N.E.2d 1122, 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), for a
modem reference to the historic ceremony of seisin and its meaning.
4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39, at 953.
Livery of seisin involved either (1) going on the land and having the
grantor symbolically deliver possession of the land to the grantee by
handing over a twig, a clod of dirt, or a piece of turf (called livery in
deed ) or (2) going within sight of the land and having the grantor tell
the grantee that possession was being given, followed by the grantee's
entering the land (called livery in law). Id.
47 See Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1245. For an explanation of how first
possession theories may be examined as accession separately and after Locke's view of
labor, see Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 459
(2009).
48 Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 747, 750 (1990)
[hereinafter Epstein, No New Property].
49JoHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1988) (1690).
50 See Epstein, Root of Title, supra note 1, at 1227.
51 Rasband, supra note 43, at 1012. The alternative theory advocated, for example, by
Margaret Radin is founded in Hegelian ideas of personhood. See generally MARGARET
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993); G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
(S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books 1996) (1896) (discussing how personhood and
property are interrelated and distinguishable from each other).
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Carol Rose's words, the doctrine of first possession utilizes "texts. .. of
cultivation, manufacture, and development."5 2
Epstein argued that the Lockean linking of labor and land through use
and habitation was a part of the "great American experiment in
government," which was "a striking departure from the English view of
property rights" that Epstein described as focusing on the King as the "first
lawful possessor of property rights from whom all other persons obtained
their title to land" via land grants. Epstein contrasted the English system
of land grants with the American system, finding that "the basic theory was
that property rights emerged from first possession, first occupation, and
homesteading, and not from state grant." 54  Although Epstein's
understanding is correct as to the ultimate formulation of property rights in
England, there is less evidence to support his claim that the American
system was a "bottom up" system (as opposed to what he styles the British
system of "top down"), at least within the Appalachian region during the
mid to late eighteenth century."
C. Evidence ofPossession
Early cases suggest that large-scale land grants fell short of
establishing rights to land where homesteaders had already placed
themselves. 56 For example, in Green v. Watkins, 7 the U.S. Supreme Court
required that land be "vacant"-empty of white settlers-before a state
land grant could validly operate to convey title to the land. Although this
appears to establish a preference, it more effectively indicated a race to the
land, and land grants from legislatures were naturally faster than settlers in
wagons crossing mountains.
Wilma Dunaway's recent study of Appalachia found very little
evidence of inhabitant-owners:
Actually Kentucky redistributed very little land to people
who lived on and cultivated the soil. Rather than legislate
52 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin ofProperty, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 73, 82 (1985)
[hereinafter Rose, Possession].
5 Epstein, No New Property, supra note 48, at 749.
54 Id. at 750.
ss Id. at 749-50.
56 See, e.g., Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1814) (involving an issue of whether
the title issued by a land grant was barred by a claim of adverse possession).
" 20 U.S. 27 (1822).
5 See id. at 29-30.
[39:5160
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the transfer of acreage to small homesteaders in the early
1800s, Kentucky's Policymakers favored land grants to
"monopolizing capitalists" for "the purpose of
speculation" and to promote industry. As a result less than
one-third of Kentucky's frontier titles were held by actual
inhabitants. In Floyd, Laurel, Pulaski, and Whitley
Counties there were no settlement entries among the early
grants.59
Although the evidence from settlement of the Appalachian region does not
support Epstein's claim that settlement was preferred over land grants in
America,o the more important point is that the transition Epstein
assumed-one of the creation of a new system of habitation-based
settlement in America as contrasted to the British system of "top down"
ownership 6 1-is misleading. Land grants were deeply significant in
establishing ownership of land in both colonial America and the new
Republic, 62 but more to the point here, Epstein's idea of the British system
as entirely "top down"63 does not accurately reflect the British approach to
unsettled land during the colonization period.
More recent evidence suggests that when faced with unsettled land, the
British did not initially vest the King with possessory rights but rather the
opposite: a subject's habitation of unsettled land secured the King's rights
to it." The English favored possession as a means of establishing title, and
possession was defined in very specific ways that aligned with the
concepts of habitation and labor-the building of fencing, the planting of
gardens, the building of homes, and the living within those homes.65
s9 Wilma A. Dunaway, Speculators and Settler Capitalists: Unthinking the Mythology
About Appalachian Landholding, 1790-1860, in APPALACHIA IN THE MAKING: THE
MOUNTAIN SOUTH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 50, 61 (Mary Beth Pudup, et al. eds.,
1995).
6 0 Epstein, No New Property, supra note 48, at 749.
61 Id. at 749-50.
62 See id. at 749-51 (discussing how land grants were given without conditions in the
United States and how that influenced our conception of title and governmental regulation).
63 Id. at 750.
6 See PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE'S CONQUEST OF THE NEW
WORLD 19 (1995).
6 1 Id. at 65.
2011] 61
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IV. WASTE: THE INVENTION OF LABOR
The connections between property, possession, and labor were indeed
so strong that some theorists, such as Scrope (who elaborated on
Blackstone's original theory), have suggested that possession is not valid
as a property claim unless there is "full and complete utilization" of the
property. 6 This understanding of labor and possession birthed a second
concept known as waste,6 7 which while little known today, is integral to
understanding the evolving relationships between property, possession, and
land.
The concept of waste dates at least back to biblical times when the
notion of a wasteland was connected with the concept of wilderness.
Religious usage was a part of the transformation of the idea of waste into a
popular cultural norm. Wasteland became synonymous with wilderness
"against which civilization had waged an unceasing struggle." As
settlements developed and the population expanded in England, Scotland,
and Wales much property was claimed, but there remained vast unsettled
areas. 70 Beyond the "common lands" that were shared by the members of
any village or manor, there were also large tracts of land that fell between
villages or manors that were not specifically allocated.7' These non-arable
lands were known as wastes and were not claimed as property. 72 Simply
put, the wastes were not possessed within the English understanding of the
term.73 As Vattel proclaimed in his treatise on International Law during
the mid-eighteenth century, the vast territories of North America could be
legally settled because they were not inhabited and farmed-they were not
possessed within the English understanding of the term.74
66 Pat Moloney, Colonisation, Civilization and Cultivation: Early Victorians' Theories
of Property Rights and Sovereignty, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE BRITISH DIASPORA 31 (A.R. Buck, et al. eds., 2001).
6 Id. at 25.
68 RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 13 (3d ed., 2001).
69 Id. at 8.
70 See KENELM EDWARD DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 8 (Claredon Press 2005) (1897).
n' H.S. BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEASANT CONDITIONS 56-
58 (1989).
72 DIGBY, supra note 70, at 8.
7 BENNETT, supra note 71, at 56.
74 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 38
(James Brown Scott ed., Chares G. Fenwick trans., 1758).
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Little scholarly work from the time exists to explain ownership of the
wastes, and from what is known there are contradictions.7 ' Even
contemporary writers disagreed as to whether the wastes were rightly
shared between all of the neighboring villages only7 6 or with anyone within
the country.77 The lack of precise explanation, even by such landmark
legal treatises as Blackstone's Commentaries, suggests that more
accurately, the wastes simply did not fall within the framework of property
rights developed at the time. This view is supported by a number of
accounts which suggest that the land within the waste was open to "the
opportunity for approvement [sic], with or without new grants" as well as
"inclosure"-a term which referenced the fencing of an area for
cultivation, the building of a home, or both. The doctrine of waste
continued much later than might be expected and was still a concept very
much in the English mind at the time of settlement of North America.79
Much of the United Kingdom remained in the "waste" category through
the end of the 1700s.80 Even though populations were growing and natural
resources on the islands dwindling, the English still lacked the technology
81and knowledge necessary to make many areas of the country productive.
V. SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURY EVOLUTIONS IN
PROPERTY: POSSESSION, LABOR, AND WASTE IN THE COLONIES
Historically, it has been the fate of lands unclaimed or known as
wastes to disappear. 82  As settlements became denser and property less
abundant, more and more lands that were un-owned or owned in common
7 See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 71, at 56-57; FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND,
TowNSHIP AND BOROUGH 98 (1898).
7 BENNETT, supra note 71, at 56-57.
7 VATTEL, supra note 74, at 94. Notably, in many accounts, wastelands are categorized
with roads, which were considered the public property of all. See, e.g., J.N.L. Baker,
England in the Seventeenth Century, in AN HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ENGLAND BEFORE
A.D. 1800, at 387, 394 (H. C. Darby ed., 1969).
7 E.C.K. GONNER, COMMON LAND AND INCLOSURE 109 (1912); see also Nellie Neilson,
English Manorial Forms, 34 AM. HIsT. REV. 725, 726 (1929).
7 See MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 2.
80 FIRST REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, APPOINTED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE MEANS OF PROMOTING THE
CULTIVATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE WASTE, UNINCLOSED, AND UNPRODUCTIVE LANDS
OF THE KINGDOM 9 (1796).
8 See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 90-91 (1998).
82 See GONNER, supra note 78, at 43-45.
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were reduced to individual property, and as agricultural techniques
developed, more and more land became arable. However, colonization
presented a new challenge to the evolution of property law: there was no
shortage of land,84 so the issue became claiming as much as possible when
there were other competitors seeking to do the same.85
An English observer by the name of Riley from the eighteenth century
explained the problem fittingly:
The English colonies are now confined within the
Appalachian Mountains, a space not two hundred miles
broad, and to lands certainly not so fruitful as those upon
the Ohio and Mississippi. Upon the banks of the latter
river, the French may in time become so very powerful, as
to render our plantations beyond the mountains precarious,
unless we exert ourselves, and settle those lands with the
same spirit and rapidity as we have our other colonies ...
besides the advantages of such an attempt in a political
view; the objects of trade with the Indians, and the great
probability of finding mines; I mean not of gold and
silver ... but of iron, copper, lead and coal, which, the
three first especially, may become branches of industry:
Leave Spain to dig gold.
Riley went on to proclaim that by the "observation of Mr. Locke, it [the
land] will only remain with the careful and industrious."87
Traditionally, we have often thought of the colonial process as purely a
question of power, naval supremacy, and willingness to settle in a foreign
land,88 but recent historical work details a much more legal question.8 9 The
tendency to group colonial powers together as one force against the native
peoples has resulted in a history that has said little about the way land
83 See ScoTr, supra note 81, at 39, 41, 90; see also GONNER, supra note 78, at 42.
8 See Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early
Australia, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 95, 99-100 (2005).
85 id.
86 J. RIDLEY, THE ADVANTAGES OF A SETTLEMENT UPON THE OHIO IN NORTH AMERICA 2
(1763) (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 3.
88 See generally Ronald J. Horvath, A Definition of Colonialism, 13 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 45, 46 (1972) (defining a unified theory of colonialism).
89 See, e.g., J. Michael Williams, Law, in 1 COLONIALISM: AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL,
CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 334, 334-36 (Melvin E. Page ed., 2003).
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possession took place, particularly vis-A-vis other European powers.90
Historian Patricia Seed recently broke this trend persuasively arguing that
European colonial powers believed not only in their military superiority
but also in their legal right to colonial lands.91 The European imperial
rulers had certain points of agreement between them. Each believed in the
right of Christian rulers to grant charters to non-Christian lands.92
Traditionally, it has been this right-the right of conquest-which has
garnered attention in the legal world.9 3 However, Patricia Seed's novel-
historical work has pointed us toward a more neglected question-one with
deep implications for our modern system of property rights.94 If each
country believed in its right to colonial lands, how were property and
possession concepts translated across cultures when England, Spain, and
France all claimed the same region?
A. Conflicting Cultures of Property
In any legal system, property doctrines are particularly tied to
narratives and imbedded within social practices and understandings." In
other words, property rights are deeply socially contingent-a fact that also
renders them subject to change with major shifts in society. The colonial
desire to appropriate-and the belief in the right to do so-was a product
for each country of its own cultural history.96 Unsurprisingly then, Seed
describes a colonial history full of competing and conflicting notions of
property and first possession.9 7
Although "discovery" was later argued as a right for English
possessions in North America, there is little evidence that the English
90 SEED, supra note 64, at 3.
9' Id. at 2.
92 Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony
of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century, 26
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 315, 319 (2001) [hereinafter Tomlins, The Legal Cartography].
93 See, e.g., SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 47-49 (1996) (discussing how
European nations used Christianity and legal rights as rationales for colonizing non-
Christian lands).
94 See generally SEED, supra note 64 (providing a historical account of property rights
of colonial lands).
9 Neal Milner, Ownership Rights and Rites of Ownership, 18 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
227, 227 (1993).
96 SEED, supra note 64, at 6.
9 7 See id. at 2-6, 12.
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themselves subscribed to this belief-at least through the first decades of
settlement.9 8 The English favored possession as a means of establishing
title.99 The French, by contrast, did not believe that they needed to inhabit
the areas they claimed within the New World.'00 Instead, the French
transferred their claim of land forward by virtue of the consent of native
peoples through alliances (however cooperative).'01 In essence, the French
were making the natives into French people and using their own already
existing habitation to make claims to land. Similarly, the Spanish argued
the native tribes they conquered, or who surrendered to them peacefully,
became "subjects and vassals" of Spain, and thereby, transferred the claim
of Spain to the lands that they occupied.102
This colonial environment of conflicting claims to land and natural
resources is no dusty, historical relic. For legal concepts, it was a
primordial stew teeming with clashes and encounters, strategies and
changes, optimization and failure. Unfortunately, histories of law and
colonialism have followed a relatively strict dichotomy-either the story of
European domination and the imposition of outside law and governance, or
alternatively, the story of how subordinated groups mobilized opposition
and used the European legal system to offer resistance. 0 3 Neither fully
embraces the dynamics of the colonial environment. The first category
may be corrected by adding that both colonizers' and natives' concepts
were interacting to create the elements of the New World's social and
political structure.'" With respect to the second category, there is much
evidence that although colonizers held powerful tools-cartographic and
legal-those tools were also "an imaginative resource not entirely under
the colonizer's control."'o In addition to these two major threads of
"Id. at 17.
9'Id. at 16, 18-19.
'oo Id. at 41-42, 44, 48.
'0' Id. at 41, 44.
'02 Id. at 81.
103 John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Forward, 26 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 305, 306-08 (2001) [hereinafter Comaroff, Colonialism].
104 See Andrew Sluyter, Colonialism and Landscape in the Americas:
Material/Conceptual Transformations and Continuing Consequences, 91 ANNALs Ass'N
AM. GEO. 410,420 (2001).
105 Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 331; see also JOHN L. COMAROFF
& JEAN COMAROFF, 2 OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION: THE DIALECTICS OF MODERNITY
ON A SOUTH AFRICAN FRONTIER 365-67 (1997) (noting the contradiction of a legal system
(continued)
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investigation, historians have also recognized that colonial possessions
were laboratories of legal experimentation. o0 Yet, Seed's work, when
brought into dialogue with what we know about the evolution of common
law concepts of property, suggests yet another line of inquiry-one that
questions the truth of the euphemism of the "common law inheritance."
How did the British concepts of property and possession transform as they
encountered distinct parallel theories in other cultures and as those
competing theories clashed in the colonial context?' 0 7
B. The Evolution of British Concepts of Property
We have recognized that much transformation of British concepts of
property occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
According to Thompson, property was solidifying and emphasis was
shifting to commodification-the ability to rent, sell, and deed property. 08
As the doctrine was evolving, so was the relationship between law and
property, or more specifically, between property and the state. There was a
drastic rise in the prosecution of property crimes.109 During the economic
crises of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Peter Lawson
demonstrated that the reporting and prosecuting of property crimes rose
substantially.1 0 Douglas Hay investigated execution rates during the
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries."' According to Hay, about
75% of executions involved property crimes, with a total of somewhere
between 500 and 1,000 over a period of fifty years.112
that provides for both the subordination of indigenous peoples as well as provisions
allowing a cause of action by those same indigenous peoples for such subordination).
106 Comaroff, Colonialism, supra note 103, at 308; see also Christopher Tomlins, In a
Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse of English Colonizing, and the Refusals of
American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 451, 453-54 (2003) (discusing how English
legal texts were modified to fit the colonial experiment) [hereinafter Tomlins, In a
Wilderness of Tigers].
107 See generally SEED, supra note 64, at 6-7.
08 EDWARD PALMER THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON 135 (1993).
10 Peter Lawson, Property Crime and Hard Times in England, 1559-1624, 4 LAW &
HisT. REv. 95, 95 (1986).
"Id. at 112-13.
111 See Douglas Hay, Crime, Authority and the Criminal Law: Staffordshire 1750-1800,
at 519 (Aug. 1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Warwick) (on file with
the Center for Research Libraries).
112 See id.
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Such changes have been thought to emerge within the British socio-
political context, the enclosure movement, and so forth.1 3 Euro-centrism
has shrouded the possibility that the deep evolution of property during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not originate in Europe and spread
to the colonies.1 4 Rather the colonial experience, driven by increasing
industrialization, powered these major shifts in doctrine-the common law
shifted on the colonial margins and then moved toward the center rather
than vice versa."s Contests over property, a natural source of change in
our theoretical concepts, were playing themselves out in the colonial
context in powerful ways-just as Frederick Jackson Turner recognized
when he argued that the westward expansion, rather than the initial
settlement frameworks, was the primary factor in the development of
American socio-legal traditions."'
Encounters of European powers in North America demonstrate an
initial obliviousness to their contrasting understandings of possession.11
Simply put, they were, symbolically as well as literally, ships passing in
the night. With each set of property beliefs deeply ingrained in a cultural
narrative, one's own set of beliefs must have seemed wholly natural. In a
foreign encounter, the tendency was to speak past each other."' With no
international law governing claims to non-Christian lands, each country
argued its right to possession in terms that made sense in its own legal
context." 9
C. Influence of Waste on the Evolution of Property
The British imported their understanding of possession and its strict
associations of habitation and labor, as well as their concept of waste.12 0
This allowed them to claim any land that was not being "used" or even
"utilized to the fullest,"l21 just as had been acceptable in the British
homeland. "Entire categories of landscape that were agriculturally
113 See DAVID LEVINE, REPRODUCING FAMILIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENGLISH
POPULATION HISTORY 60 (1987).
114 See AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A
WORLDVIEW 46 (2d ed. 1999).
115 Id.
116 
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1-4 (1928).
117 SEED, supra note 64, at 10-11.
"n See id. at 3, 12.
"9 See id. at 11-12.
120 Id. at 19.
121 Moloney, supra note 66, at 31.
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productive before colonization have become reconceived as
'wastelands."' 1 2 2 Indigenous people were not seen as inhabiting the land in
the sense of dwelling and cultivating, but rather, were seen as movable.12 3
Thus, the Georgia Charter's 1732 description of America explains: "[T]he
land is 'waste and desolate,' the indigenous population simply a marauding
enemy."l24 In the eyes of many sixteenth and seventeenth century
developers, the entirety of America was a waste awaiting development. 125
When it came to other colonial powers, the English government
refused to recognize that discovery or claim, without settlement upon the
land, was a legitimate source of a right to that territory.12 6 When the
Portuguese government argued claim and discovery, the English
recognized the foreign king's claim "where he ha[d] forts and receive[d]
tribute." 2 7 Similarly, when the Spanish also argued that their possession
of discovered lands in the New World gave them ownership of the lands,
the English government responded that declaration and decree do not make
ownership; only possession through habitation was capable of generating
title.'28
Unfortunately, the British understanding of wastes and the association
of possession with labor quickly became a problem. Wastes were, at their
most central, lands of many types (mountains, forests, swamps) that one
could not easily cultivate.129 Consequently, claiming land within the waste
areas was particularly trying for doctrines of property that aligned rightful
control and possession with the idea of habitation and settlement.130 The
wastes could not be settled very rapidly-at least not by societies that were
primarily agricultural and possessed very limited transportation
mechanisms.131 In fact, the common law tradition still recognizes that
122 Sluyter, supra note 104, at 411.
123 See Tomlins, In a Wilderness of Tigers, supra note 106, at 470.
124 id
125 Wayne Glausser, Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade, 51 J. HIST. IDEAS
199, 215 (1990).
126 SEED, supra note 64, at 9-10.
127 Replication of the Portuguese Ambassador from June 7, 1562, in 4 CALENDAR OF
STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH, 1562, at 77 (Joseph Stevenson
ed., 1867).
128 SEED, supra note 64, at 10.
129 See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding
Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 283, 292-93 (2006).
13 0 See id. at 292.
131 See BENNETT, supra note 71, at 58.
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"wild and undeveloped land" is "not readily susceptible to habitation,
cultivation, or improvement."' 32 With the colonial process strongly driven
by the idea of appropriating supposedly endless supplies of natural
resources,133 the English understandings of possession and waste were a
bothersome vestigial tail, both cumbersome and limiting.
During the earlier centuries in England, the issue of settling waste had
not appeared in any substantial form.' 34 First, waste existed in relative
abundance, and those who wanted to stake claims within it were often
allowed to do so-at least in the part that was not claimed by a particular
lord.135 And more importantly, the terminology itself is telling. Waste was
waste. No one wanted it very desperately. Although the English were
aware of the resources in waste, and at times limited the taking of
resources from wastes owned by a particular lord, waste was often open to
taking by the commoners.' 36 This free taking extended to what we now
call "natural resources," such as coal, which commoners dug for their fires
from within the waste. 3 7
D. Influence of Industry on the Evolution of Property
This trend would continue until industrialization quickly refrained the
value of natural resources as commodities.'38 By the seventeenth century,
coal was "being rapidly developed" within English lands.' 39 This desire to
find resources fueled the imperialism of the British.140 Settlement in North
America was more than an extension of the British state; it was an
"expedition," and one generally financed by commercial sources that
expected a return.14' Early maps of North America mapped natural
resources as often, or even more often, than they mapped potentially life
132 Klass, supra note 129, at 292 n. 42.
133 Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 337.
134 See BENNETr, supra note 71, at 57, 59.
135 See id. at 57-59.
' Id. at 57-60.
13 THOMAS BLOUNT, TENURES OF LAND & CUSTOMS OF MANORS 163 (W. Carew Hazlitt
ed., Reeves & Turner 1874) (1784).
13 Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1149,1193 (1997).
139 Baker, supra note 77, at 421.
140 See, e.g., Carville Earle, Pioneers of Providence: The Anglo-American Experience,
1492-1792, in 82 ANNALS OF THE Ass'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 478, 481 (1992); Moloney,
supra note 66, at 32.
141 See Earle, supra note 140, at 479-8 1.
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threatening "obstacles" to those resources, such as native settlements, river
rapids, waterfalls, rattlesnake ridges, and bear flats. 142 Even more notably,
the push to possess resources was not driven for the British by the desire
for gold, but rather for resources that had specific commercial application
such as timber, oil, iron, and coal.143
Unfortunately, the French and the Spanish could obtain land in North
America far more rapidly than could the British.'" Each made their legal
claim to land through imagining possession in a very different way than the
English-through conquest and alliance, deputizing and consent rather
than through the settlement of their own citizens. 145 For the French and
Spanish, the movement was easier. They could "deputize" the natives into
second-rate citizens through either consent or military force, and then,
protect the claims with a limited military through a series of forts.14 6 Thus,
the progression of land claims in North America-at least initially-
strongly favored the French and Spanish. 14 7 There is much evidence that
the British were highly unhappy about this situation. 14 8 They complained
that they were "hemmed in" and that the French had cut them off from the
"bounty" of the main part of the continent.14 9 The British were hungry for
the resources found on the far side of the Appalachian Mountains and
within the range itself.'50
142 See SEYMOUR I. SCHWARTZ & RALPH E. EHRENBERG, THE MAPPING OF AMERICA 77
(Patricia Egan & Reginald Gay eds., 1980); RICHARD VAN DE GoHM, ANTIQUE MAPS FOR
THE COLLECTOR 58-59 (1973); TURNER, supra note 116, at 16. Rattlesnake ridge continues
to be an area in Carter County, Kentucky and the place name is kept in the county utilities.
See RATTLESNAKE RIDGE WATER DISTRICT, http://www.rrwater.org/ (last visited Dec. 27,
2010). Also, maps still identify bear flats in Elliott County, Kentucky. See, e.g.,
SATELLITEVIEWs, http://www.satelliteviews.net/cgibin/g.cgi?fid=2337138&state=KY&ftyp
e=flat (last visited Dec. 27, 2010).
143 RIDLEY, supra note 86, at 2.
4 See, e.g., Jeremy Adelman & Stephen Aron, From Borderlands to Borders: Empires,
Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History, 104 AM. HIs. REV.
814, 820-21 (1999); SEED, supra note 64, at 64; Arthur R. Ropes, The Causes of the Seven
Years' War, in 4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC. 143, 145 (1889).
145 SEED, supra note 64, at 6, 18-19, 41-48, 81.
146 See id. at 63-68, 81.
147 See RIDLEY, supra note 86, at 2.
148 See, e.g., Adelman & Aron, supra note 144, at 821; Ropes, supra note 144, at 150;
RIDLEY, supra note 86, at 2.
149 Ropes, supra note 144, at 148-50.
150 WILMA A. DUNAWAY, THE FIRST AMERICAN FRONTIER: TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM
IN SOUTHERN APPALACHIA 1 (1996).
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E. The British Move Away from the Possession Theory ofProperty
As settlement progressed in the North American colonies, it became
clear that if the British were to keep up in colonial North America, it was
critical for the British to establish claims to land that they did not in fact
inhabit.1'5 The British needed to adapt their common law that had for
centuries favored possession--defined in terms of habitation and
cultivation-to a new theory of property that allowed for the claiming of
lands, at least by the government if not by individuals, that were unseen
and perhaps even unexplored.152 As John Sprankling argued, "Eighteenth
century English property law was a poor tool for encouraging the
exploitation of virgin land."' 5 3 The British had to move their concept of
property from tangible possession to an intangible legal claim that would
be respected by other foreign powers.15 4 The British had to move from
fences to borders, and as they did so, they also moved from habitation to
survey as a method of establishing land claims.155 The concept of claiming
land replaced labor as the ideal of possession with the perfection of title. 56
In his classic, The Transformation of American Law: 1780-1860,
Morton J. Horwitz chronicled an evolution of property law from an
original agrarian idea of absolute dominion-the notion expressed in the
Roman ideal of property-to a later utilitarian vision of use.157 When the
focus moves specifically to the relationship between our notions of
possession and labor, Horwitz's theory of evolution receives a significant
correction. The property ideal has evolved from an original idea of
absolute dominion to a utilitarian notion of use and labor and from there
evolved again to an idea of claim and development. This notion, which
privileges rights and sets aside the question of labor, is focused on
providing the maximum incentive for natural resource development and
can historically be traced to the socio-legal norms of the industrial
revolution.
1' See Lynton K. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-the Need for a
New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 759, 760-61 (1974).
152 Epstein, No New Property, supra note 48, at 749-50.
153 Sprankling, Antiwilderness, supra note 17, at 523.
154 See Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 328-29.
.ss See id. at 326-27.
156 Rose, Possession, supra note 52, at 85-86.
157 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 31-34 (1977).
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F. Influence of Survey Mapping on the Evolution of Property
A central aspect of this process of land claim was the development of
survey and mapping technologies. Through survey and mapping, land
became something that was literally possess-able." In another sense, a
sheaf of papers in the hand, even though still intangible as a social right,
held up against others. 5 9 In the field of geography, much has been written
about the relationship between mapmaking and the process of
colonization.160  Edney, for example, has argued, "Imperialism and
Mapmaking intersect in the most basic manner. Both are fundamentally
concerned with territory and knowledge."' 6 ' The project of mapping of
lands was in itself a major force behind the process of colonization.162
Drawing on the increasing power of science, maps projected images of
land that were pre-political and assumed rationality and detachment. 6 1
"Maps speak the language of authority and expertise precisely by virtue of
their detachment."'" This detachment is, on closer inspection, a figure of
the scientific imagination. Only in the last three decades have we become
socially cognizant of the nature of maps as persuasive rather than neutral
documents.165  As J.B. Harley explained in his path-breaking article,
Deconstructing the Map, "All maps state an argument about the world and
they are propositional in nature ... [t]he steps in making a map-selection,
omission, simplification, classification, the creation of hierarchies, and
'symbolization'-are all inherently rhetorical." 6  Until recently, this
thread of work on colonization and mapmaking in the field of geography
1ss Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 323-24, 326.
159 Id
160 See, e.g., id. at 322-24; MATTHEW H. EDNEY, MAPPING AN EMPIRE: THE
GEOGRAPHICAL CONSTRUCTION OF BRITISH INDIA, 1765-1843, at 1 (1997); TIMoTHY
MITCHELL, COLONISING EGYPT 32 (1991).
161 EDNEY, supra note 160, at 1.
162 See id. at 1-2.
163 MITCHELL, supra note 160, at 6-7, 32-33.
' Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 567, 598 (1998)
[hereinafter Blomley, Landscapes ofProperty].
165 See, e.g., J. Brian Harley, Deconstructing the Map, 26 CARTOGRAPHICA 1, 1-2
(1989) (arguing that maps are rhetorical devices used to obtain power) [hereinafter Harley,
Deconstructing the Map].
11 Id. at 11.
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awaited connection to the role of law. However, the work of Christopher
Tomlins and Nicholas Blomely has brought these two fields together.167
Nicholas Blomley attributed much of the change in common law
property to the development of scientific tools during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. In his 2003 article, Law, Property and the
Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid, Blomley
attributes much of the evolution in property occurring during this time
period to technical innovations, in particular, the three geographical
concepts of the frontier, the survey, and the grid.'6 8  Techniques in
surveying and drafting were emerging, and thereby, facilitating the
administration of property relations. 16 9 Blomley argues maps and, more
generally, the linear perspective allowed us to create "the view that space
in general, and property in particular, were disembedded from lived and
social relations."o In the public discourse, maps were drawing upon "the
Enlightenment understanding of science," a view that "the world can be
mapped exactly, the world can be known," and that the map is "natural"
and becomes the world itself.17 1
One very relevant example of this is the transformation of maps of the
colonies over time. The earliest maps showed lands deeply settled by
native tribes whereas later maps displayed space as empty-to be written
over.172 As shown below, the 1607 map of Virginia by Captain John Smith
names many tribes and settlements and places the greater emphasis on the
Native American figure to the left side of the map.
7 3
167 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The Frontier, the
Survey, and the Grid, 93 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEO. 121 (2003) (discussing how surveying
and property law intersect) [hereinafter Blomley, Geography of Violence]; Tomlins, The
Legal Cartography, supra note 92 (reviewing how maps and surveys were used to
transform the acquisition of property in the American colonies).
168 Blomley, Geography of Violence, supra note 167, at 123.
' 9 Id. at 128.
"o Id. at 127.
'17 EDNEY, supra note 160, at 21.
172 Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 335 n. 27.
173 See John Smith, Captain John Smith's Map of Virginia, (Oxford, Joseph Barnes
1612), available at the Yale University Beincke Rare Book & Manuscript Library, call
number Taylor 256.
[39:5174




By the time the map was reproduced a few decades later, the crest had
moved forward in prominence and increased in size whereas the native
figure decreased and settlements became blank. 176 In some instances, the
persuasive changes can be rather obvious-although only if given the
opportunity to view the two versions.
More generally, Blomley's well-received argument is that "[t]he
manner in which space was projected, bounded, and named .. . can be
174 id
175 Hendrik Hondius, Nova Virginiae Tabula (Amsterdam, Hondius 1633), available at
the Yale University Library Map Collection, call number Franklin 783 1633.
176 Compare Smith, supra note 173, with Hondius, supra note 175.
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consequential for the ways in which property relations are understood."'7 7
At a more obvious level, maps were the way in which territory became real
estate. Mapping was becoming increasingly common,'7 9  and
cartographic skills were developing. 80  According to Blomely, an even
more intimate relationship was being forged between the state, property,
and violence as the military became increasingly involved in surveying and
the production of maps."s'
Christopher Tomlins argued that the process of mapping combined
with a legal cartography, which was embodied in the many colonial
charters, provided a way to "imprint England on America." 8 2 Through
charters, the Europeans were able to project forward their existing legal
concepts into an idealized new settlement, establishing proper orders. 83
Although Tomlins adds in the element of legal doctrine, he notes that it
worked in tandem with the cartographic developments.184 Tomlins argues
that "British access to technologies of systematic measurement-geodetic
triangulation, statistical survey-allowed them to discipline the Indian
subcontinent with their science."'8 5
Maps are, at their most basic level, practices of representation.1
187
Maps were, therefore, able to "extend and reinforce" our legal concepts.
Symbolic discourse in maps was perhaps one of the most powerful tools, at
least in the colonial context, where a painting of a ruler, a crest, a seal, or
an imprint was used to symbolize governance, control, and possession.1
Queen Elizabeth, for example, placed the royal arms on each map
177 Blomley, Landscapes ofProperty, supra note 164, at 606.
178 Comaroff, Colonialism, supra note 103, at 309.
179 See Blomley, Geography of Violence, supra note 167, at 126.
80 See id. at 128-29.
18 Id. at 128.
182 Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 331.
183 Id. at 316.
1 Id. at 326.
1 Id. at 324. See EDNEY, supra note 160, at 200-01, for a similar view.
186 DEREK GREGORY, GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATIONS 7 (1994).
187 Harley, Deconstructing the Map, supra note 165, at 12.
188 Peter Barber, England II: Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 1550-1625, in
MONARCHS, MINISTERS, AND MAPS: THE EMERGENCE OF CARTOGRAPHY AS A TOOL OF
GOVERNMENT IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 57, 77 (David Buisseret ed., 1992).
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produced to reinforce her rule.' 89 More concretely, maps were a method to
effectuate surveillance.190 In the context of the social relationships of
property, the critical point was that maps embedded within them existing
ideas about social structured and propertied relationships.' 9'
In this way, maps and surveys were critical to the transformation of
possession's attachment to labor into an association with claim. Maps and
surveys allowed the British government to project an image of possession
that could be shown to others at home and abroad.192 Maps were serving
as the transition point between possession and claim; maps were moving
from mapping actual habitation and settlement to mapping by virtue of
lines-lines that projected claims of land onto unsettled and possibly
unexplored areas.'" In this way, both the British and American
government would come to describe lands not formally admitted as states
or provinces as "territories of the United States" or "possessions of Her
Britannic Majesty." 9 4 Consequently, the common law continued to speak
of possession but no longer could specifically link possession to labor.
G. Influence of Early Case Law on the Evolution of Property
The question was placed at the forefront in the 1814 case, Green v.
Liter.'9 ' In Green, the Supreme Court was challenged to decide whether a
settler occupying a tract of land could hold title against a challenger who
had an earlier land grant from the state but had never actually entered upon
the land.'9 6 The difficulty here was that the settler had not entered upon
189 J. Brian Harley, Maps, Knowledge, and Power, in THE ICONOGRAPHY OF
LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION, DESIGN AND USE OF PAST
ENVIRONMENTS 277, 280 (Denis Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988).
'90 Id. at 300.
'91 See Tomlins, The Legal Cartography, supra note 92, at 324.
19 2 d.
193 Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain in 1842, 8 Stat. 572
(1848) ("A Treaty to settle and define the boundaries between the territories of the United
States and the possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the final
suppression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up of criminals, fugitive from
justice, in certain cases.").
194 id
19' 12 U.S. 229 (1814).
196 Compare id. at 230 (discussing a situation where John Liter, the settler, entered
under color of a younger patent from the state after challenger John Green's older patent
was issued), with Clay v. White, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 162, 162-64 (1810) (discussing a
(continued)
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the land until after the land grant.197 In an opinion by Justice Story, the
Court stretched to find reasons why a non-occupying grantee might prevail
over a settler even though the settler had no actual notice of the grant and
settled in good faith.198 Although such an outcome may not seem
obviously just, it did strongly favor the policy of industrialization and
development. The Court sought common law justifications for what was,
in fact, a colonial doctrinal invention by engaging a number of common
law cases where uncommon circumstances prevented entry onto land after
there had been an intent to transfer the land.'99 Notably, none of these
cases involved the first possession of land.2 00 Yet, the Court looked to
these cases instead of examples of first possession conflicts in North
America decided by earlier courts or to the common law notion of defining
possession, and therefore title, in terms of habitation.20' The important
issue the Court found was that "the legislature was competent to give their
patentees a perfect title and possession without actual entry."202
Notably, Story's opinion holds:
At the time of the passing of the [A]ct of 1779, Kentucky
was a wilderness. It was the haunt of savages and beasts
of prey. Actual entry or possession was impracticable;
and, if practicable, it could answer to no beneficial
purpose. It could create no notoriety; it could be evidence
to no vicinage of a change of the property. An entry
therefore would have been a vain and useless and perilous
act.203
Such a rendition of the facts deeply reflects the moral perspective of
industrialization. Settlement could-and did-rapidly occur in the
Appalachian Mountains, although it did follow behind the more rapid entry
situation where White, the settler, entered under color of a younger patent from the state
before the even younger grant to Clay).
197 See Green, 12 U.S. at 244-49.
' Id. at 244.
19 See, e.g., Clay, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 162-64; Speed v. Buford, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 57, 57
(1813); Patterson's Devisees v. Bradford, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 108, 109-10 (1807); Quarles v.
Brown, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 203, 203 (1802).
200 See Clay, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 162; Speed, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 57; Patterson 's Devisees, 3
Ky. (Hard.) 108; Quarles, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 203.
201 Green, 12 U.S. at 236-38, 240.
202 Id. at 248.
203 id
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for the sole purpose of exploiting natural resources. 204 The Court
concluded that even if at common law there were a requirement for
habitation and occupation to take possession of land and establish title,
"the doctrine would be inapplicable to the waste and vacant lands of our
country."20 5 Grounding the historic requirement of actual possession solely
in the idea of notice to the community, Story was able to reason that land
grants were sufficient for the wilderness because "the reason of the rule
itself ceases when applied to a mere wilderness."20 6
By 1832, the transformation in the idea of possession was complete,
and the labor-habitation model was dismissed in favor of the land grant,
which favored industrialization. In United States v. Arredondo,207 the
Supreme Court found ancient law where there was none stating, "This
gives to the words 'in possession of the lands' their well settled and fixed
meaning; possession does not imply occupation or residence; had it been
so intended, we presume they would have been used." 20 8 Possession had
become entirely separable from title, with the Court holding that "the law
deems every man to be in the legal seisin and possession of land to which
he has a perfect and complete title."209
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCES TODAY
Possession, rather than being a basic and unalterable beginning point,
is a complicated socio-legal construction that hoards within itself a variety
of attitudes toward land and ideals of human behavior.2 10 We continue to
speak of possession, however, as though it is something literal and
physical, as though labor has attached property to body, issuing a mud of
soil, blood, sweat, and tears. It is the same sentiment expressed by Oliver
Wendell Holmes when he said, "A thing which you have enjoyed and used
as your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
204 See, e.g., Paul Salstrom, Newer Appalachia as One of America's Last Frontiers, in
APPALACHIA IN THE MAKING: THE MOUNTAIN SOUTH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 76, 83-
84 (Mary Beth Pudup et al. eds., 1995); Kathleen M. Blee & Dwight B. Billings, Violence
and Local State Formation: A Longitudinal Case Study ofAppalachian Feuding, 30 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 671, 697 (1996).
205 Green, 12 U.S. at 249.
206 id
207 31 U.S. 691 (1832).
2 0
1 Id at 743.
209 di
21o See discussion supra Part III.A.
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your being and cannot be torn away." 211 Yet, even as we continue to think
of possession in the literal sense and dwell on the bodily uniting of soil and
labor, historical evidence demonstrates that, at least in the America
tradition, labor was divorced-from possession during the colonial era as the
British government sought to make more and more extensive claims to
212land and natural resources far beyond its lines of settlement.
By neglecting the colonial evolution of property and possession
concepts, our cultural concepts falsely reach back into the depths of the
common law speaking of possession and labor as wed and linking them
with private property and "the very foundation of civilization. 213 As
Jennifer Nedelsky observed, such myths of property are "pernicious,"
shielding "a structure of power and insulat[ing] it from democratic
debate."214 By speaking of possession as though it is literal-a thing not to
be disturbed because it is too close to disturbing the body of the man
himself, his home, his family-we have reified property as a thing never to
be disturbed. A thing not to be touched by taxes any more than absolutely
necessary. A thing not to be impinged upon by the well-being of others.
We have protected property as though it is a personal right-something
akin to personal liberty or freedom, something not to be touched by the
211government or by others without extraordinary circumstances. We have
211 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Common Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897).
212 See SEED, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing how Colonial rule was initiated largely
through practices such as remaining silent and that sometimes the silence preceded military
conquests for settlement because Europeans living in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century
believed in their right to rule).
213 HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE OF
INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH THE INCREASE OF WEALTH-THE
REMEDY 261 (1886). Henry George criticizes this view of private property and land
possession as a basic requirement for a civilized society. Id. at 261-62. He acknowledges
that this belief is pervasive in American society. Id. at 261.
214 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITs LEGACY 260 (1990).
215 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights
Genie, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 53 (1996). The reality, of course, differs from the rhetoric.
The property owner's right to be free from government interference is a limited one-based
only on the right to productive use of the land. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (holding that a taking occurs when a regulation takes all economic
beneficial use of a landowner's land). Yet we often speak of a landowner's right "to
do ... as he sees fit" with property. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987).
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treated land as an extension of the body-in the way that a woman can be
assaulted by a man who simply grabs hold of her purse and tugs hard as he
runs away. By- thinking of possession literally, even though in reality we
have transferred our common law sense of possession from cultivation and
habitation to instead a piece of paper granting ownership, we have treated
*216property as an unassailable, personal right.
Unfortunately, such an association of property and unassailable
personal rights obfuscates a central fact of property: the relationship
between ownership of land and wealth in a society. 217 The story is ironic.
There is a deep emotional link between labor and property in terms of
sustenance and survival.2 18 Yet, sustenance and survival, in terms of both
poverty alleviation and environmental stewardship, are jeopardized by our
willingness to view private property as a personal right never to be
impinged. Sustenance is dependent on property; in the words of Henry
George, "[L]abor cannot produce without the use of land." 2 19  Private
property is not a personal right but rather a social one-one that must
constantly be held in relation to others. 220 Although personhood may be
216 See generally Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within
Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 930 (2000). My argument is, to some degree,
a parallel to Lynda L. Butler's more broad argument that many real property norms
inherently conflict with reasonable natural resource and ecosystem management. Id. at 928.
217 GEORGE, supra note 213, at 209-10.
218 Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 1, at 40. Rose suggests that Locke's
major contribution to property theory was not so much in terms of explaining the labor link
as by elaborating the connection between property and survival. Id.
219 GEORGE, supra note 213, at 241.
220 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 31, 31-32 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich eds., 1974); Joseph
William Singer, Property and Social Relations from Title to Entitlement, in PROPERTY AND
VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 8, 11, 15-16 (Charles Geisler
& Gail Daneker eds., 2000). In a more blunt formulation, Henry George said, "There is in
nature no such thing as a fee simple in land. There is on earth no power which can
rightfully make a grant of exclusive ownership in land." GEORGE, supra note 213, at 52-53.
Such powers to grant ownership claims are productions of society, not a natural part of our
environment. Id
Historically, there were a number of Marxian analyses of property arguing that property
was, in and of itself, a tool to exploit others. See, e.g., C.M. Hann, Introduction to The
Embeddedness of Property, in PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL
TRADITION 1, 3-4, 14-16 (C.M. Hann ed., 1998); Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of
Property and Its Contemporary Significance, in PROPERTY 3, 4-5 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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attached to or expressed within land that is ancestral, those attachments
reference the far smaller portion of land in the United States with the
greater portion of land involved in commercial enterprises.221 Thus, the
majority of land in the United States should not be equally entitled to the
vast and gracious system of rights attached to our notion of property as a
literal possession.
Reifying property as an unassailable right has consequences that go far
beyond maintaining an already stable system of private property and
capitalism. The intent here is not to argue against such a system,
particularly when it is existent and stable. Our cultural and social
understandings of property are intimately linked to our willingness to in
any way limit a property owner's rights-including sufficiently taxing
natural resource extraction, particularly when there are significant
environmental consequences to extraction.22 2 As Carol Rose observed,
"[N]arratives change our minds,"2 23 so when we speak of possession and
labor as though the common law always made claims to land through their
intertwining, we conceptualize property and justify it in those terms.224 We
often think of our property system as justified because it supposedly
originated with a first possession, from which all subsequent titles are
derived via a valid legal transfer of the property interest, and which is
justified on the basis of man's need to inhabit and cultivate a parcel of land
for his direct survival. The intention here is to suggest that there is more
myth than truth to this idea of the original establishment of title, at least
within the United States and particularly within the system of common law
property that we have inherited. Our concept of property harbors within it
a more particular view of natural resources and the legal method of making
a claim upon those resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although we have spoken of possession as a basic level concept, one
without need of much explanation and elaboration, a closer examination
shows that our definition is decidedly circular.225 We define possession in
221 Hann, supra note 220, at 8 (showing that inheritance was previously the dominant
way to receive property).
222 See Singer, supra note 220, at 6-7, 10-11 (showing that limitations to property
rights will follow if there are significant public effects from an owner's actions).
223 Rose, Property as Storytelling, supra note 1, at 55.
224 Id. at 55-56.
225 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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terms of property and property in terms of possession.2 26  In future
theoretical work on property rights, possession must be engaged for what it
is: a contingent, cultural term with a variety of understandings. Only in
this way can theories of first possession serve as a justification for a system
of private property.
Moreover, we must be willing to examine critically how the
assumption of possession and labor together has reified private property as
an unassailable, private right. More than once in recent years, scholars
have argued that the truest part of democracy-the ideals of liberty,
democratic accountability, and popular sovereignty-are lost behind
property rights. 227 This may in part be a result of our tendency to closely
guard property as an almost personal right, as though the Constitution
affirmed life, liberty, and property following Locke word for word, as
opposed to substituting happiness. Ironically, such a notion of inviolable
property is not consistent with Locke's own views, which limited private
property when it interfered with the ability of others to obtain their basic
sustenance.228 We glorify private property rights to the extent that we
hesitate to impose the taxes and environmental use restrictions that would
sustain society as a whole even though Locke himself was philosophically
committed to supporting such impositions on an absolute property right.
226 See discussion supra Part III.A.
227 SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY,
COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT 3 (1986).
228 LOCKE, supra note 49, at 64-65.
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